The power under which the Grenfell Tower Inquiry was established is contained within s1(1) of the Inquiries Act 2005, in which it states an inquiry can be held where it appears there are events ‘causing public concerns’.
It is suffice to say that the events that occurred in the early hours of 14 June 2017 were much more than a public concern. It was and is a tragedy on an unprecedented scale, one of the worst losses of life in a fire in recent memory. Grenfell Tower has come to symbolise an indictment of the broken systems within our society that have resulted in crippling austerity, privatisation, deregulation, and deep inequalities.
The Grenfell Tower Inquiry was formally set up on 15 August 2017 with Sir Martin Moore-Bick presiding over it. The Inquiry is split into two phases: Phase 1 which has looked at what happened on the night and Phase 2 which will look at why the fire and subsequent devastation happened.
The Phase 1 report was released into the public domain on 30 October 2019. The report is the culmination of months of evidence heard from residents who escaped, firefighters of all ranks, the emergency services, various experts, Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC), and the Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (TMO).
In summary, the Inquiry has established the following in Phase 1:
1. The cause and origin of the fire
Sir Martin explicitly exonerated our client, the tenant of Flat 16, saying that he bore no blame or responsibility for what happened in the kitchen of his flat. Sir Martin said that he is “in no doubt that the fire originated in the large fridge-freezer”, pointing strongly to an electrical fault in the appliance. The Inquiry has not been able to establish the precise nature of the fault and it considers this issue to be “of less importance than establishing how the failure of a common domestic appliance could have had such disastrous consequences”.
Read our brief statement on his behalf here.
2. The fire’s escape from flat 16 and its subsequent spread
Sir Martin concluded that the fire most likely entered the cladding as a result of hot smoke affecting the uPVC window frames, causing it to deform and collapse. This created cavities between the insulation and the cladding panels, which allowed flames and hot gases to pass through them.
Once the fire reached the cladding from flat 16, it travelled rapidly up the east side and up to the top of the tower where it spread horizontally and then downwards. The primary reason for the fast flame spread is because of the cladding which was made up of aluminium composite material (ACM) rainscreen panels with polyethylene cores which acted as a “source of fuel”. The window surrounds and the foam found behind the ACM panels contributed to the rate and extent of the flame spread.
3. Fire and smoke penetration
A high degree of compartmentation forms the fundamental basis to the ‘stay put’ policy. Compartmentation at Grenfell relied on the fire resistance of the external wall of the tower, as the external wall is what connected every room to each other.
Sir Martin established that the failure of the fire doors and a lack of self-closing devices on the doors was a contributory factor to the fire and to smoke penetration into the flats. The fire was so strong that the glass in the windows failed, further allowing fire to spread internally.
4. Building regulations
Although outside the scope of Phase 1, Sir Martin concluded that “there was compelling evidence that the external walls of the building failed to comply with Building Regulations in that the walls did not “adequately resist the spread of fire…on the contrary, they actively promoted it.”
5. The London Fire Brigade
Sir Martin did recognise the bravery of the firefighters stepping into the tower who most certainly risked their lives to save others. However, he also criticises the London Fire Brigade (LFB) in three main areas: