Reported Cases

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• The Queen (oao) Negassi (1) & Lutalo (2) v Sec of State for the Home Dept [2013] EWCA Civ 151

  Article 11 Reception directive - Damages for breach of European Directive – Causation – Article 8 ECHR

   

  The Court of Appeal rejected the Appellant Negassi’s claim for damages based upon the admitted though unintentional breach of art 11(2) of the Reception Directive by the Home Office. The Court held that there could be no automatic reparation where there had been ‘a bona fide attempt at transposition’. The Court also assessed the claim for damages on the alternative ‘multi-factorial test’ and found that the breach, which had prevented Mr. Negassi working for a year, was not ‘sufficiently serious’ to warrant a claim for damages. The Court also held that when assessing causation the test was what the Respondent would have done if they had appreciated that her actions were unlawful, and therefore that a causal link had not been demonstrated. The Court also rejected the claim by the Appellant Lutalo that he had a right to take employment under art 11(1) of the Directive where his asylum appeal had been subject to severe delays. In the case of both Appellants the Court held that a prohibition on taking employment could breach article 8 but did not do so on the facts of the cases.

  
  
  

• Duncan Lewis Goes European with First Full ECtHR Judgement(30 Jan 2013)

  Solicitors, Kat Hacker & James Packer deliver Duncan Lewis’ first full judgement in European Court of Human Rights as it tackles the issue of Disabled Persons and Article 3 ECHR Expulsion to Afghanistan. Press Release available shortly.

  
  
  

• S.H.H. v. THE UNITED KINGDOM - 60367/10 - HEJUD [2013] ECHR 102 (29 January 2013)

  Immigration – Human Rights – Article 3 ECHR – Afghanistan – Disabled Asylum Seekers
  
  Solicitors, Kat Hacker & James Packer deliver Duncan Lewis’ first full judgement in European Court of Human Rights as it tackles the issue of Disabled Persons and Article 3 ECHR Expulsion to Afghanistan.

  
  
  

• Saleh v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] EWHC 61 (Admin) (25 January 2013)

  Immigration/Public Law Detention – Administrative Court – Acted for Claimant - Challenge to lawfulness of Claimant’s detention pending Deportation – Art. 5 ECHR – Good review of Hardial Singh Principles – Automatic Deportation – Failure to Grant Bail.
  

  
  
  

• Al -Ali, R (On the Application Of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Rev 1) [2012] EWHC 3638 (Admin) (04 December 2012)

  Immigration/Public Law – Administrative Court – Acted for Claimant - Dublin II Regulation – Claimant resisting removal to the Netherlands – Art 3(2) Discretion – Excellent Review of Refoulement. Dismissed.
  

  
  
  

• Crown Prosecution Service & Ors v Gohil [2012] EWCA Civ 1550 (26 November 2012)

  Family – Court of Appeal (Family Division) - whether section 9(2) of the Crime (International Co-operation) Act 2003 Act permits the use in family proceedings of evidence obtained pursuant to a request under section 7.
  
  Held: the 2003 Act prohibits the use, without the consent of the requested state, of evidence for any purpose other than that stated in a s.7 letter of request.
  

  
  
  

• Slater v Condappa [2012] EWCA Civ 1506 (22 November 2012)

  Family Law - Court of Appeal (Civil Division) – Beneficial Interest in Property
  
  Held: to establish a claim to a beneficial interest in the property, which at the start of their relationship was in the sole beneficial ownership of the respondent, it is necessary for the appellant to establish an agreement or representation made that she should become a joint beneficial owner which she has relied on to her detriment so as to make it impossible for the respondent to seek now to resile from what he promised.

  
  
  

• V, R (On the Application Of) v Commissioner of Police for the City of London [2012] EWHC 3430 (Admin) (14 November 2012)

  QBD Divisional Court – Adam Tear Director & Solicitor Advocate acted for Claimant - Challenging police’s continued retention of claimant’s information on PNC – Breach Art. 8 ECHR. Dismissed.
  

  
  
  

• KR, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] EWCA Civ 1555 (18 October 2012)

  Court of Appeal (Civil Division) – Immigration – Adam Tear Director & Solicitor Advocate acted for Appellant - Judicial Review Costs Appeal against no order to Costs against SSHD - CPR 44.3(2) Application – Appeal Allowed.
  

  
  
  

• Mulliqi, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] EWHC 2852 (Admin) (18 October 2012)

  Immigration/Public Law Detention – Administrative Court – Acted for Claimant - Challenge to lawfulness of Claimant’s detention for period of 23 months. Held: Detention Unlawful & Secretary of State’s actions were strikingly ineffectual.
  
  The Defendant was fully entitled to detain the Claimant at the expiry of his prison sentence and to seek to deport him. There can be no doubt that there was lawful detention through to the appeal in July 2010. Given the findings of the Immigration Judge at the hearing in July, the Defendant was reasonably entitled to proceed on the assumption that the Claimant knew of living relatives in Kosovo but was declining to give their details. However, the picture is not of an unvarying refusal to co-operate since the Claimant was perfectly prepared to co-operate with a removal on 9 September 2010 and took no other positive step to prevent his removal. Indeed, he co-operated with the authorities in discussing his position repeatedly at interview and repeatedly stated the same story about his origins. This is not a case of active deception and frustration of removal.
  What is striking about this story is the sequence of contradictory and ineffectual decisions and actions on the part of the officials acting for the Secretary of State. I fully recognise that theirs was not an easy task, but it is not unfair to conclude that by the end of the period of detention in late January 2012, the Defendant had not effectively advanced one step from the position they were in late 2010. It is perhaps particularly striking that the Secretary of State took months before deciding to contact the Claimants' foster parents and then took months without being able to do so effectively. Police officers made contact with Mrs McAffee within 24 hours of the request that they should do so. So far as I am able to determine, none of the officials acting on behalf of the Secretary of State managed to make any connection about this case with either the Kosovan or the Albanian Embassies. Overall, the activity here was strikingly ineffectual and, perhaps more to the point, no-one on behalf of the Secretary of State reached the conclusion that they were getting nowhere.
  
  Doing the best that I can and making every allowance for the inherent difficulty faced by the Defendant, it appears to me that by 10 October 2011 at the latest, the Secretary of State should have realised that they were not going to effect removal within a reasonable period. The Claimant had by now been detained for 19 months. They had really made no progress. The Claimant had not assisted removal, but had not mounted any active campaign to frustrate removal, and had indicated his preparedness to be removed. The decision to detain on this occasion was made by a senior official, who expressed no view that it was going to be practical to remove the Claimant within a reasonable period. In the light of the period of detention already undergone, the Defendant's officials should have released the Claimant on bail, albeit with significant conditions and restrictions. I therefore find that the Claimant's detention was unlawful as from 10 October 2011.
  
  

• Suchanek v District Court for Prague 8 Prague Czech Republic [2012] EWHC 2987 (Admin) (12 October 2012)

  Criminal Law - Administrative Court – Acted for Appellant – Statutory Appeal against Extradition – Article 8 ECHR – Appeal Allowed.
  
  

• SG (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] EWCA Civ 940 (13 July 2012)

  Immigration/Public Law - Court of Appeal (Civil Division) – Acted for SG Appellant – Considering authoritativeness of Country Guidance Determinations - Whether the grant by the Court of Appeal of permission to appeal a Country Guidance determination justifies a stay in the cases of those seeking to challenge removal directions.
  
  Held: The system of Country Guidance determinations enables appropriate resources, in terms of the representations of the parties to the Country Guidance appeal, expert and factual evidence and the personnel and time of the Tribunal, to be applied to the determination of conditions in, and therefore the risks of return for persons such as the appellants in the Country Guidance appeal to, the country in question. The procedure is aimed at arriving at a reliable (in the sense of accurate) determination.
  
  It is for these reasons, as well as the desirability of consistency, that decision makers and tribunal judges are required to take Country Guidance determinations into account, and to follow them unless very strong grounds supported by cogent evidence, are adduced justifying their not doing so.
  
  67. In my judgment a Country Guidance determination of the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) remains authoritative unless and until it is set aside on appeal or replaced by a subsequent Country Guidance determination.
  
  68. The filing of an application for permission to appeal a Country Guidance determination of the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) cannot, of itself, justify the Court granting an injunction staying the removal of anyone whose removal is justified by that determination. However, if the judge considers that the evidence relied upon by the claimant may satisfy the test to which I refer below, it may be appropriate to grant a stay pending the decision of the Court of Appeal on the application for permission to appeal. In such a case, it may well be appropriate for the judge to suggest that the Court of Appeal expedite its consideration of the application for permission to appeal.
  
  69. Whether the grant by the Court of Appeal of permission to appeal a Country Guidance determination justifies a stay in the cases of those seeking to challenge removal directions where the decision to remove them relies or is justified by that determination must depend on the facts and the evidence relied upon by the claimant. The facts will include the content of the determination and the reasons given for the grant of permission to appeal.
  
  70. If the evidence relied upon was considered by the Tribunal, it is unlikely that a stay will be appropriate unless the reasons given for the grant of permission to appeal cast substantial doubt on the reliability of the findings of the Tribunal.
  
  71. In relation to evidence other than that considered by the Tribunal, and in particular evidence of subsequent events, I would endorse the test formulated by Irwin J. The Court should not stay removal pending the decision of the Court of Appeal unless the claimant has adduced a clear and coherent body of evidence that the findings of the Tribunal were in error.
  
  

• Lamari, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] EWHC 1630 (Admin) (18 June 2012)

  Unlawful Detention – Foreign National – Entitled to Damages for Period of Unlawful Detention – Finding of contempt made against SSHD

   

  Mr Lamari was served with a deportation order to Algeria on 15 December 2012 and had been in immigration detention since 21 December 2010 when his 12 month custodial sentence for robbery came to an end.  His history of mental illness and the effect of continuing detention upon him was a very important feature in this case. Following the Secretary of State’s refusal to release Mr Lamari, a Judicial Review on his potential unlawful detention was lodged at the Administrative Court. At a rolled-up hearing on 25 May 2012, HHJ Cotter QC indicated that he was going to order Mr Lamari’s release by 8 June 2012 and an undertaking was given by the Secretary of State to avoid such an order. HHJ Cotter QC reserved judgment for the judicial review application unlawful detention matter which was handed down on 18 June 2012. It was held that Mr Lamari had been unlawfully detained since 23 May 2012 and is entitled to damages for his period of unlawful detention. The issue of damages for Mr Lamari’s unlawful detention will be transferred to the Queen’s Bench Division for consideration.

   

  At a hearing on Mr Lamari’s Judicial Review claim, an undertaking was given by the Secretary of State for Mr Lamari’s release by 8 June 2012. This undertaking was incorporated in an Order dated 6 July 2012. Mr Lamari was not released as per the Order and on 12 June 2012 the Secretary of State made an application to the Court to release her from the undertaking provided on the basis that the undertaking was given without proper authority. Mr Lamari was eventually released from detention at 9:00pm on 14 June 2012 and an application for committal of the Secretary of State was filed on 15 June 2012. On 18 June 2012, upon hearing from Counsel for Mr Lamari and for the Secretary of State, HHJ Cotter QC made a finding of contempt against the Secretary of State due to the breach of her undertaking to release Mr Lamari between 11th and 13th June 2012. In his judgment, HHJ Cotter QC found that there has been most regrettable and unacceptable behaviour on the 11th June 2012 and that there has been an intentional refusal to comply with the undertaking given and the order.

  
  
  

• AL (Albania) and Others v Secretary of State for the home Department [2012] EWCA Civ 710

  This test case was heard to give general guidance as to the correct basis of the order for costs where the appeal is disposed of by consent in circumstances in which the appellant has obtained a benefit – either a remittal to the court below to re-hear the appeal or some other benefit from the appellate process. The Court joined three separate appeals which raised similar issues and heard them together: two of those were Duncan Lewis cases.

  The Court held that although statutory appeals to the Court of Appeal from the Upper Tribunal have distinctive features, CPR 44.3 applies to them. Accordingly, the starting point is that the Court has a discretion as to whether to make an order that costs are payable by one party to the other (CPR 44.3(1)(a)). If it decides to make such an order, the general rule is that the "unsuccessful" party will be ordered to pay the costs of the "successful" party, although the Court may make a different order (CPR 44.3(2)).

  The Secretary of State had had the practice of suggesting that an appeal in Court of Appeal had only an ‘arguable prospect of success’, but that it would be proportionate to deal with the matter in the Upper Tribunal. They would then argue that as there was no ‘clear winner’ in the Court of Appeal each party should pay its own costs. However the Court of Appeal settled this issue once and for all, holding that ‘Whatever the Secretary of State may say, the making of the consent order by this Court assumes an error of law, without which there would be no jurisdiction for this Court to remit or for the Upper Tribunal to revisit the case.’

  The Court accepted that there may be cases where there are features or complexities which would justify the Court deciding not to make a positive costs order where an appeal is remitted to the Upper Tribunal they should be relatively rare, and based upon the specific facts of the individual case. The Court rejected any suggestion that justifies a default position of "no order as to costs" in appeals from the Upper Tribunal. The Court of Appeal overturned the earlier decision on this point in Sengoz v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] EWCA Civ 1135.

  The result of this case where an appeal to the Court of Appeal is based upon good grounds the Appellant’s costs will normally be paid by the Defendant, even if the matter does not go to a final hearing.

  
  
  

• Almeida v Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea [2012] EWHC 1082

  Duncan Lewis helps dying and homeless Portuguese man who was refused accommodation and was being repatriated to Portugal by a London council to win his High Court case

  Duncan Lewis’ Community Care Department acting on behalf of Mr Almeida instructed Doughty Street Chambers to bring an application for judicial review against the local authority's failure to conduct a community care assessment of his care needs when he was being evicted from hostel accommodation his friends were no longer able to fund for him.  Mr Almeida is a Portuguese national who is terminally ill with treatment resistant AIDS and associated health problems, and due to his ill health, was unable to support himself.  During the course of the legal proceedings the local authority assessed Mr Almeida's needs, but found him not to be in need of care and attention and therefore concluded that they did not have a duty to accommodate and support him under section 21 of the National Assistance Act 1948. 

   

  It was argued that the decision was irrational and the court quashed this decision. The court considered the question of whether Mr Almeida would be excluded from accessing support under this provision by schedule 3 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 and whether in offering assistance in returning to Portugal would breach his Human Rights.

   

  Held: Breach of Article 3 ECHR and Article 8 ECHR. Right not to be subject to inhumane and degrading treatment. To send him to an undignified and distressing end in Portugal, facing difficulties in obtaining accommodation and benefits, and parting from his existing support network of friends and health professionals would amount to a breach Article 3 ECHR and Article 8 ECHR right to private life, on the basis that the financial burden to the local authority to continue to provide support to Mr Almeida would not justify an interference with his private life, given that any potential saving they would make in assisting him to return to Portugal to end his life would be minimal. Mr Almeida's claim was therefore allowed.

  
  
  

• ST Eritrea, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] UKSC 12 (21 March 2012)

  Immigration/Public Law - UK Supreme Court – Considered whether article 32(1) of the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) apply only to a refugee who has been given the right lawfully to stay in the contracting state, as its domestic law would answer that question or must the words "lawfully present in the territory" be given an extended and autonomous meaning, so as to ensure that a refugee who has not yet been given a right to remain in the territory is afforded protection.

  The Supreme Court – Lady Hale and Lords Hope, Brown, Mance, Kerr, Clarke and Dyson – unanimously dismissed the appeal in this case. Delivering the leading judgment Lord Hope (Deputy President) defined the domestic interpretation of ‘lawful’ and said at para 49

  There are thus no sound grounds for departing from the view that “lawfully” in Article 32(1) [“The Contracting States shall not expel a refugee lawfully in their territory save on grounds of national security or public order”] must be taken to refer to what is to be treated as lawful according to the domestic laws of the contracting state. This is what the framers of the Convention intended by the use of this word in this context.

  On appeal from: [2010] EWCA Civ 643

  
  
  

• JD (Congo) & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] EWCA Civ 327

  Duncan Lewis was instructed in the lead case of JD (Congo) & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] EWCA Civ 327 in which the Court of Appeal considered, and provided guidance on, the ‘Second Appeals Test.’ Specifically, the court has dealt with the second limb – i.e. what factors are to be taken into consideration in deciding whether or not there is a compelling reason for a case to be heard. The court has confirmed that the following can be taken into account:
  
  • That there is a sufficiently serious legal basis for challenging the [IAC Chamber] Upper Tribunal’s decision (Paragraph 26)
  • The extremity of the consequences of the Upper Tribunal's allegedly erroneous decision for the individual seeking permission to appeal from that decision. (Paragraph 27)
  • Whether or not there has been, in substance only one level of judicial consideration, and to that end:-
  • The reason why the First Tier Tribunal's decision was set aside (Paragraph 30)
  • The extent to which it was possible to preserve the findings of fact of the First Tier Tribunal (Paragraph 31)
  In summary, the court has decided that where an Appellant wins in the First Tier Tribunal (as in our client’s case), this is not sufficient on its own to constitute a ‘compelling reason’ for a case to be heard. The court will however take into account the particular circumstances of each case in deciding whether or not there is a compelling reason for a case to be heard, which could include the fact that an appellant has succeeded before the First Tier Tribunal and failed before the Upper Tribunal. (Paragraph 23). If there is a sufficiently serious legal basis for the challenge then that is to be considered alongside the consideration of the extremity of the consequences of the allegedly wrong decision. Our client, JD was successful in obtaining permission to appeal.
  
  

• Saleh, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] EWHC 329 (Admin) (03 February 2012)

  
  Immigration/Public Law – Administrative Court – Challenging legality of Immigration Detention following signing of Deportation Order – Somaliland – Dismissed.

• R v Local Authority and Others [2011} EWCA Civ 1451

  
  In relation to a child, subject to care proceedings, a Supervision Order was granted to the local authority and a Residence Order to the mother. The father had sought unsupervised contact. A risk assessment concluded that he remained a risk to children and should only have supervised contact with the child. The father sought a second expert’s opinion. His application was refused and he was granted supervised contact. He unsuccessfully appealed the decision to refuse his application for a second expert’s opinion in the Family Proceedings Court and again from the Family Proceedings Court to HHJ Hughes QC. He therefore appealed to the Court of Appeal.
  
  The basis of the appeal was that the trial judge and the first appeal court should have allowed the application for a second expert and failure to do so amounted to an error of law; invalidated the exercise of judicial discretion and thereby limited the father’s contact to take place on a supervised basis only. S.55 (1) of the Access to Justice Act 1999 was satisfied by virtue of the fact that the appeal raised questions of, the correct approach to be taken by the court on an application for a second expert’s report on what is asserted to be a key issue in the case; the time at which an application for a second expert is considered; the approach in considering the application and the distinction between the way the issue is determined by the civil and family courts.
  
  Appeal dismissed. Held: that it was apparent that the judge at first instance had made findings of fact based upon the evidence before the court; that the trial judge at first instance had appropriately exercised his discretion and that judges in family proceedings decide each application for a second opinion on the merits by reference to the Overriding Objective, the Practice Direction and the Family Proceedings Rules 2010. In each case it is a matter of judgment, and the crucial question remains for the judge to consider, “do I need this report in order to enable me to deal justly with the case? What will the additional expert add to the case?
  
  

• NA (IRAN) v SSHD – [2011] EWCA Civ 1172

  This case concerned a vulnerable mother and child whom the UKBA were trying to remove to Latvia under the third country (Dublin II) regulation. We argued that due to the mother’s mental health illness and risk of suicide, it would be a breach of Article 3 and Article 8 ECHR if they were to be removed to Latvia. The medical reports and evidence available confirmed that there was a risk that the mother would act on her suicidal ideations if she were to be removed. This would in turn affect the wellbeing of her child.
  
  The Court of Appeal acknowledged that Chapter 45 of the Border Agency’s Operational Enforcement Manuel was defective. The Court confirmed that the policy was not compliant with Section 55 of the Borders Act 2009 and considered the policy to be a one-way street. This is because the policy was lacking ‘any slip-road for cases in which it has become apparent since the process was initiated that there is now a real risk of violating a Convention right if return is proceeded with.’ (Paragraph 34).
  
  The Court went on to consider whether on the evidence before the court there was a real risk that removal of the mother and her baby to Latvia will result in a violation of the Convention rights of either or both of them. Although the Court acknowledged the defect in the policy it went on to decide that the material before the court did not reach the required threshold.
  
  However, the Court stated that the law calls for a constant and careful watch on the family unit and a sensitive and appropriate response to the issues raised by the professionals. The Court stated that ‘it does not permit the Border Agency to treat the claimant as if she were now on a one-way street from which there was no exit’.
  We are currently considering our position in respect of an application to appeal the case to the Supreme Court.
  
  

• Suckrajh, R (on the application of) v The Asylum & Immigration Tribunal & Anor [2011] EWCA Civ 938 (29 July 2011)

  The claimant seeks by way of judicial review a declaration that he was unlawfully detained for 46 days in July and August 2009 by the UKBA on behalf of the second Respondent, the Secretary of State, and damages for false imprisonment and for breach of Article 5 of the Human Rights Convention. The UKBA had detained the claimant under the Detained Fast Track (DFT) procedure. The claimant contended that it had no right to do so. Under this procedure asylum seekers are detained at immigration detention facilities while their claims and any appeal are determined. The stated objective of the procedure is to enable straightforward claims to be determined speedily. Under the procedure, immigration officers of the UKBA are entrusted with making the decision on allocation to the DFT. There is a right to appeal to Immigration Judges to remove a case from the procedure or grant bail.
  
  

• FB, R (On the Application Of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWHC 2044 (Admin) (28 July 2011)

  The Claimant is an Algerian national who entered the United Kingdom in 1997. He has a history of drug abuse, alcohol abuse, mental health problems and offending. He served a prison sentence between November 2008 and June 2009. At the conclusion of the custodial period of his sentence, he was detained for the purpose of deportation on 8 June 2009. In this case he has challenged the legality of his continuing detention and sought an order for his release. Following a hearing on 12 and 13 May 2011, in an Order dated 20 May, I directed that the Claimant should be released from detention by 4.00pm on Monday 23 May 2011 upon stipulated conditions. That Order does not prevent his subsequent deportation to Algeria. In this judgment I set out the reasons for that Order.
  
  

• Bahta & Ors v SSHD [2011] EWCA Civ 895

  These are appeals against decisions as to costs made by High Court Judges in immigration cases following consent orders. AK appeals against an order of Mitting J dated 15 September 2010, TZ (Eritrea) against an order of Lloyd Jones J dated 23 September 2010, RO against a decision of Mitting J dated 20 December 2010, Filmon Bahta against an order of King J dated 21 December 2010 and KD against an order of Edwards-Stuart J dated 17 February 2011. Following orders whereby disputes between the appellants and the Secretary of State for the Home Department (“the Secretary of State”) were resolved without a contested court hearing, each judge declined to make an order for costs in the appellants’ favour.
  
  

• S (A Child), Re [2011] EWCA Civ 812 (15 July 2011)

  This is an appeal (for which permission was given on paper by Ward LJ on 10 May 2011) against an order made by Her Honour Judge Judith Hughes QC on 21 March 2011 refusing an application by the appellant for a residential parenting assessment pursuant to section 38(6) of the Children Act 1989 (the Act). It raises a number of important issues for practising family lawyers and for judges, and it is principally for this reason that we reserved judgment at the conclusion of the argument on 22 June 2011.
  
  

• Rozo-Hermida, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWHC 695 (Admin) (23 March 2011)

  The Claimant arrived in the UK in November 2002 and was granted leave to remain as a student. He raped a 21 year old female passenger in May 2004 when he was working as a rickshaw driver. Following a trial before His Honour Judge Price and a jury at the Snaresbrook Crown Court in March 2005 he was convicted and sentenced to 8 years imprisonment. The judge made no recommendation for deportation. He added a Sexual Offences Prevention Order (SOPO) prohibiting the defendant for an indefinite period "from becoming involved in any form of private hire transportation". As a consequence of the conviction and sentence the defendant was to be placed on the sex offenders register indefinitely. An application for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence was refused by the single judge and was not renewed to the full Court of Appeal (Criminal Division).
  
  

• Rose v R. (Rev 1) [2011] EWCA Crim 579 (16 March 2011)

  This is an appeal with the leave of the single judge against sentence. The appellant, Oshane Everton Rose, born 21 May 1989 is now aged 21. On 14 December 2004 at Snaresbrook Crown Court, he pleaded guilty on re-arraignment to an offence of rape of a child aged 12 years contrary to section 5(1) Sexual Offences Act 2003. By reason of the age of the complainant, whom we shall call K, she could not in law consent to the act of oral intercourse alleged. On his change of plea the appellant submitted a basis in which he said that (1) he believed the girl to be a similar age to himself, or about 15 years (2) the sexual activity was consensual, and (3) he was not in possession of a knife. The basis of plea was not accepted.
  
  

• Secretary of State for the Home Department v Abdi [2011] EWCA Civ 242 (09 March 2011)

  These conjoined appeals pose a question which is as difficult to answer as it is easy to state: in deciding whether a foreign national facing deportation has been detained for too long, does time which he has spent appealing against deportation count? If it does, then sufficiently protracted legal proceedings will sooner or later secure his release however weak his case and however strong the reasons for detaining him. If it does not, then a detainee with a sound legal challenge to removal or deportation may be penalised for asserting his rights by years of incarceration. So the question inexorably raises another question: is there a middle way?
  
  

• Negassi, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWHC 386 (Admin) (04 March 2011)

  The claimant is a national of Eritrea first entered this country in September 2005 using a false name and passport and claimed asylum the following day. On 27 January 2006 his application was refused. He appealed unsuccessfully and his appeal rights were finally exhausted when his application to this court for a reconsideration of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal's decision was rejected on 30 March 2006. The Administrative Court, in dismissing the claimant's application for judicial review, held that although there had been an error in the transposition of art 11 of Council Directive EC 2003/9 (laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers), it was not sufficiently serious as to found a claim for damages. Further, there had been no breach of art 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
  
  

• AH v West London MHT [2011] UKUT 74 (AAC) (17 February 2011)

  Having, on 29th July 2010, in exercise of its power under section 12(2)(a) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 15th October 2010 not to grant AH a public hearing, the Upper Tribunal now re-makes the decision in exercise of its powers under section 12(2)(b)(ii).
  
  

• Nasire, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWHC 3359 (Admin) (21 December 2010)

  The main issue in this application is whether the Claimant's further representations dated 29 July 2009 and 25 August 2009 entitle him to an in-country right of appeal under sections 82 and 92 of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 ("the 2002 Act"). This depends on whether in refusing the Claimant's further representations in this case the Defendant either made, or should have made, an "immigration decision" as defined in section 82 of the 2002 Act. For it is only if the Defendant makes an immigration decision that there is a right of appeal.
  
  

• Secretary of State for the Home Department v DD (Afghanistan) [2010] EWCA Civ 1407 (10 December 2010)

  Defining Article 1F(c) and its application. Is attacking the UN, an act sufficient to bring you within the exclusion clause of Article 1F? This will be the the first case to deal with the issue of Article 1F(C) within the Supreme Court.
  
  

• The Secretary of State for the Home Department v Respondent [2010] UKUT B1 (10 December 2010)

  This judicial review application concerned a refugee from Afghanistan who had This is the Appellant's appeal against the decision of an Immigration following a hearing at Manchester in November 2009. The Immigration Judge allowed the Respondent's appeal against the decision of the Appellant made in June 2009 to give directions for his removal from the UK. The Appellant sought permission to appeal on three grounds. Firstly the Designated Immigration Judge had failed to provide adequate reasons for finding that the Respondent enjoyed family life with [ ] and the children. Secondly, that the Immigration Judge failed to have full regard to the evidence of criminality as part of the proportionality assessment and thirdly he applied an incorrect test thereby creating an artificially high threshold for the Secretary of State to make out his case.
  
  

• Anwar & Anor v Secretary of State for the Home Department [11th Noveber 2010] EWCA Civ 1275

  The Court of Appeal in a judgement issued on 11th November 2010 have described the actions of the Secretary of State as making ‘a shameful decision’ and found that their attempt to stifle the right of an appeal was ‘a serious abuse of power’. In an important judgement the Court of Appeal clarified the jurisdiction of the tribunal to hear appeals against these decisions in certain circumstances, whilst underlining that judicial review will always lie against decisions of this kind.
  
  

• OM (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWHC 2147 (Admin) (13 August 2010)

  This case is a challenge to the past and current detention of the Claimant Ms OM. It further challenges the lawfulness of the actions of the Defendant, the Secretary of State for the Home Department ("SSHD"), in refusing to treat recent submissions as constituting a fresh claim giving the Claimant a right of appeal against deportation whilst in the UK, for otherwise she will be deported. Orders have been made for the anonymity of the Claimant and her children but they have been referred to openly in court and I propose to preserve anonymity in respect of her and her male child S born in 2000 and her female child M born in 2005.
  
  

• Brill v Interactive Business Communications Ltd [2010] UKEAT 0062_09_2004 (20 April 2010)

  Mr Brill appeals from two decisions of two different Employment Judges made prior to the hearing of his substantive claims against his former employer. By Notice of Appeal dated 8 January 2009 he appeals from the decision of Employment Judge Metcalf of 10 December 2008 to revoke permission to amend his ET1, such permission having been granted by Employment Judge Bedeau. Employment Judge Metcalf refused permission to amend the ET1. The appeal from the decision of Employment Judge Metcalfe of 10 December 2008 to revoke permission to amend the ET1 is allowed. The application to revoke permission to amend the ET1 and, if necessary, the application to amend the ET1 are remitted to an Employment Judge for decision. The appeal from the judgment of Employment Judge Southam of 6 January 2009 is dismissed.
  
  

• AH v West London MHT [2010] UKUT 264 (AAC) (29 July 2010)

  The Upper Tribunal in exercise of its powers under s12(2)(a) Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 sets aside the decision of the First–tier Tribunal dated 15 October 2009 not to grant AH a public hearing, and directs that the question be considered and determined by the Upper Tribunal following a further hearing (at which we invite the Department of Health to appear) for the purpose of considering further evidence.
  
  

• ZO (Somalia) & Ors, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 36 (28 July 2010)

  A Somali national arrived in the UK in 2003 when his asylum claim was initially refused. The Appellant subsequently applied for permission to work in the UK which was refused in 2007. The Court of Appeal had to decide whether the case was covered by Article 11(2) European Union "Reception Directive".  The case then went onto the Supreme Court.
  
  

• Secretary of State for the Home Department v ST (Eritrea) [2010] EWCA Civ 643 (09 June 2010)

  This appeal raises an important question as to the effect of Article 32 of the Refugee Convention, namely whether a person who is, or is recognised to be, a refugee within the meaning of the Convention and the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees is by reason of that status alone entitled to the protection of Article 32 of the Convention, which precludes removal "save on grounds of national security or public order".
  
  

• YH, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWCA Civ 116 (25 February 2010)

  The case raised the issue of how the courts should respond to repeat claims for asylum or human rights protection where an individual makes further submissions or allegations while in the UK or having left and on return to the UK. The appellant, an Iraqi citizen had made repeated claims beginning in November 2000 on the basis that he feared ill treatment in Iraq due to his involvement in illegal trade. The court dismissed his appeal for asylum and found his story to be inconsistent particularly as it had changed in his final submissions and he had no evidence to support his claims.
  
  

• Ahmad, R (on the application of) v the Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWHC 2982 (10 January 2010)

  This judicial review application concerned a refugee from Afghanistan who had previously been treated as having claimed asylum in Greece under the provisions of the Dublin Regulation. The appellant claimed that he was unlawfully detained by the UK authorities on his illegal entry into the UK and made a claim damages for his detention. The court decided that the UK authorities were under a duty under the Dublin Regulation to return the appellant to Greece as soon as Greece would accept responsibility. The appellants appeal and claim for damages dismissed as there was sufficient reason for the authorities to believe that the appellant was an abscond risk and his detention was legal.
  
  

• KH (Afghanistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 1354 (14 December 2009)

  The appellant, an Afghan national initially sought asylum unsuccessfully in the UK in 2002. Since then, the appellant’s mental health problems surfaced and he was diagnosed with depression and required continued medication. The appellant wanted to overturn the decision of the Secretary of State that an immigration judge would dismiss a subsequent appeal for asylum on the basis that the removal of the appellant from the UK would constitute a breach of Articles 3 and 8 of the ECHR. It was decide that this should be treated as a medical case but that the mental illness of a failed asylum seeker could not make that case an “exceptional case” where it would be a breach of Article 3 to return that asylum seeker to his country of origin. The appellant’s appeal was dismissed.
  
  

• EW, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWHC 2957 (18 November 2009)

  The claimant, an Eritrean national arrived in the UK in 2009 and it emerged that he had been fingerprinted in Italy in 2008. The UK made a formal request for Italy to accept responsibility for the claimant’s asylum application under the Dublin Regulation and the claimant’s UK application for asylum was refused. The claimant challenged the Secretary of States decision on the basis that (a) the UK was in breach of its obligations under Article 3 because he would face inhumane treatment once returned to Italy and (b) the Secretary of State should have exercised his discretion to accept responsibility for dealing with the claimant’s asylum claim due to the Italian authorities treatment of asylum seekers and various other breaches of European Union directives. The court decided that there was insufficient evidence that the claimant would suffer ill treatment under Article 3 and that Italy did not avoid its internal obligations towards asylum seekers. The claim was dismissed.
  
  

• Gunama, R (on the application of) v Entry Clearance Officer, Manila [2009] EWHC 2583 (23 October 2009)

  The claimant, a national from the Philippines was seeking to challenge the decision of the Entry Clearance Officer, Manila (ECO) to refuse her entry into the UK as a student. The supporting documentation for the claimant’s application stated that she wanted to study at an institution which was found by the ECO not to be a “bona fide education institution” under paragraph 57(i)(b) of Part 3 of the Immigration Rules. The claimant had however since her initial application registered as a student at a college to complete a course that the court considered would meet the criteria of paragraph 57. It therefore decided that the ECO should re-consider the claimant’s application for the entry into the UK as a student.
  
  

• R on the Application of Ariemuguvbe v. London Borough of Islington [2009] EWCA Civ 1308 (21 October 2009)

  The Appellant, a Nigerian citizen, married a British citizen, her first husband, in 1994 before remarrying in 2008. In 1998, the Appellant’s 5 children joined her in the UK on visitors’ visas. From 2007 until 2008, the Appellant lived with her second husband, her 5 children and her 3 grandchildren in a 3-bedroom flat, let by the Respondent. The Appellant contended that she was entitled to bid for a larger property under the Respondent's housing allocation scheme. The Court of Appeal held that the Appellant’s application for judicial review was rightly refused since the Respondent, despite being entitled to do so, was not compelled to take into account the Appellant’s adult children when deciding what accommodation was suitable under s160A(3) of the Housing Act 1996.
  
  

• In the matter of O(A Child) [2009] EWCA Civ 1273 (16 October 2009)

  E was the daughter of Turkish and British parents who were married. The mother applied for permission to appeal against an order made in relation to her daughter under the Hague Convention 1980 and the Child Abduction and Custody Act 1985. The Court of Appeal held that the mother's removal of E to England had been a wrongful abduction from Turkey within the meaning of the Convention and that the Convention required him to order E's return to Turkey.
  
  

• AK & FH (KOSOVO) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 1032 (09 September 2009)

  The sons of well known Serb collaborators claimed to be at risk of losing their lives if they were returned to Kosovo. It was submitted that the collaboration by the Appellants’ relatives with Serb military authorities would put the appelants’ lives at risk. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. The Court held that it was unable to challenge the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal's determination since the Court was satisfied that the Office of Communities, Return and Minority Affairs' position was not confined to the passage in paragraph 120 of the determination about being returned.
  
  

• Heald & Ors v London Borough of Brent [2009] EWCA Civ 930 (20 August 2009)

  The Appellants contend that it was unlawful for Brent to contract out the carrying out of its reviews, with the result that the reviews carried out in each of their cases were themselves ultra vires and unlawful. They also contend that there was an appearance of bias on the part of Mr Perdios which meant that their reviews were not fairly conducted and that their rights under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights were infringed.
  
  

• AM, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 833 (30 July 2009)

  These two appeals have been heard together because they raise a common point to which different judges sitting in the Administrative Court have given different answers. The point concerns the proper interpretation and application of the Home Office's Iraq Policy Bulletin 2/2006 ("the policy bulletin"), which was introduced after the decisions in R (Rashid) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 744 and R (A) (H) and (AH) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWHC 526 (Admin).
  
  

• Ghassemian v Borough of Kensington & Chelsea [2009] EWCA Civ 743 (08 June 2009)

  This is an application for permission to appeal on the grounds in the reamended grounds of appeal from the decision of HHJ Behar dated 27 June 2008 dismissing an application to set aside an order dated 9 May 2007 made pursuant to Section 75(7) paragraph (a) of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 and CPR 70.5.
  
  

• Odelola (FC) (Appellant) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Respondent) [2009] UKHL 25 (20 May 2009)

  A Nigerian citizen with a medical qualification from a Nigerian University applied for leave to remain in the UK as a postgraduate doctor. Following her application, the Immigration Rules changed and no longer extended to foreign applicants with medical qualifications earned outside the UK. The Court decided that the new rule applied to all cases in which leave still had to be granted and not only to doctors who had not yet applied under the new rule.
  
  

• ZO (Somalia) & Anor, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 442 (20 May 2009)

  A Somali national arrived in the UK in 2003 when his asylum claim was initially refused. The Appellant subsequently applied for permission to work in the UK which was refused in 2007. The Court of Appeal had to decide whether the case was covered by Article 11(2) European Union "Reception Directive". The Court held that the Reception Directive did apply to subsequent applications.
  
  

• KH (Afghanistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 836 (19 May 2009)

  The Appellant, an Afghan national, initially sought political asylum in the UK in 2002 which was unsuccessful. He submitted a new application for non-removal in 2005 on grounds of his mental condition. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on the basis that the Appellant would be unable to cope with the destitution which he would likely endure if he returned to Aghanistan.
  
  

• Omondi, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWHC 827 (Admin) (23 April 2009)

  The short question raised in these proceedings is whether s.83 applies to a person who has had leave, but only in the past, unrelated to his asylum claim or its rejection.
  
  

• In the Matter of Z (A Child) [2009] EWCA Civ 430 (06 April 2009)

  This mother of three children appealed against an order for unsupervised contact by their father to the two youngest children. The mother alleged that she had a fear that the father may abduct the children to Algeria, a country which is not a signatory to any child abduction international treaty. The Court of Appeal decided that the appeal should be allowed on the basis that the district judge failed to hold a full fact-finding hearing and failed to cross-examine the father on the mother’s allegation that he intended to abduct the children. These omissions were held to be contrary to the Practice Direction which was designed to tell judges how to go about deciding issues of residence and contact.
  
  

• Elyarna Alexander-David v. The Mayor & Burgesses of the London Borough of Hammersmith & Fulham [2009] EWCA Civ 259 (01 April 2009)

  Possession proceedings were commenced in 2007 by the Respondent following unresolved complaints against the Appellant. The Court of Appeal held that the Respondent had purported to grant the Appellant a legal estate with the consequence that, in accordance with paragraph 1(1) of Schedule 1 to Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996, the agreement was not effective to grant her a legal tenancy, and operated as a declaration by the Respondent that it held the premises in trust for the Appellant. Consequently, service of notice to quit only on the minor beneficiary of the trust was not sufficient to terminate the tenancy.
  
  

• S & Ors, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 142 (25 February 2009)

  The circumstances in which claims such as the present will succeed are very rare indeed. The facts must be exceptional. Delay in advancing the case will be fatal. Those who advise claimants should be aware of that before embarking on proceedings, often at public expense.
  
  

• Semere, R (on the application of) v Asylum and Immigration Tribunal [2009] EWHC 335 (Admin) (25 February 2009)

  The case of Semere confirmed time limits for the submission of applications for reconsideration in immigration and asylum appeals, extending the deadline from 4pm on the last day for service until the end of that day.
  
  

• S & Ors, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 334 (25 February 2009)

  The circumstances in which claims such as the present will succeed are very rare indeed. The facts must be exceptional. Delay in advancing the case will be fatal. Those who advise claimants should be aware of that before embarking on proceedings, often at public expense.
  
  

• Ariemuguvbe, R (on the application of) v London Borough of Islington [2009] EWHC 470 (Admin) (24 February 2009)

  The issue in this judicial review is whether Islington London Borough Council were entitled to ignore the claimant's adult children, who are subject to immigration control, when considering the allocation of accommodation under Part VI of the Housing Act 1996. The case boils down to whether in exercising their powers under Part VI of the Housing Act 1996, the Council can refuse to allocate larger accommodation to the claimant. The challenge is by way of judicial review in relation to a decision set out in letters dated early last year, whereby Islington Council decided to exclude the claimant's five adult children in their assessment of what constituted suitable accommodation under their allocation policy.
  
  

• G v A [2009] EWHC 11 (Fam) (20 January 2009)

  These are proceedings brought by a mother pursuant to section 15 of and Schedule 1 to the Children Act 1989. The proceedings relate to N, who was born in March 2001. His parents were never married.